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Studies of ommuniation between entities in virtual environments have tended to
fous on the relevant tehnial issues and its soial impat impat. An important om-
ponent of human ommuniation is the onveying of aetive information via voie,
faial expression and gestures and other body language. Virtual environments may be
populated by representations of human or virtual agent partiipants. Communiations
may be between person-person, agent-agent or person-agent. This paper explores the
possible use of the aetive ommuniation in virtual environments. The desirabil-
ity of aetive ommuniation is examined and some researh ideas for developing
aetive ommuniation in virtual environments are proposed.
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1 Introdution.
The onepts of virtual environments, and of ommuniation within these environments
(\virtual ommuniations"), have beome widely used in reent years. There are urrently
no lear denitions assoiated with these expressions, the only ommon theme seems be
of ommuniation between entities that are physially remote from eah other, either
beause of a spatial or temporal disloation, or beause one or more of the partiipants is
an artiial agent of some form.
Assoiated with virtual environments there is also a lak of larity of what is atually
expeted of ommuniation. Is there an expetation of rereating the rih interation of
physial ommuniation between humans, or is some other alternative senario, possibly
riher or poorer, envisaged?
In this paper we explore the range of virtual environments and the possible partiipant
groups. In this disussion we plae an emphasis on ommuniation between virtual entities
whih make use of other data apart from the fatual information being ommuniated. In
partiular we would like to explore the apaity of virtual environments to ommuniate
aetive states, i.e. those aspets of ommuniation onerned with emotional response,
and further to explore how agents within virtual environments an model and use aetive
states to enhane the realism of the virtual environment.
2 Virtual Communiation in Virtual Environments.
A ore funtion of virtual environments is to failitate ommuniation between entities
in that environment, be those entities human users or agents. It is often assumed that
the ultimate objetive of ommuniation within virtual environments is to model om-
muniation between humans in the physial world. In order to ahieve this objetive
ommuniation apabilities within the virtual world must not be limited to the simple
exhange of information. Everyday human ommuniation involves a level of aetive
ommuniation (ommuniation involving emotional states) that is absent from many vir-
tual environments.
If virtual environments are to be truly representative of the real world they aim to
model, they must both (1) failitate the ommuniation of aet, and (2) agents situated
in the environment must reat in a way that respets the aetive ontext in whih they
nd themselves. An agent that ignores these aspets of the environment will jar with the
realism of the environment as muh as one that ignores the laws of physis.
The emergene of Aetive Computing as an area of pratial sienti study is very
reent [Pi97℄, although this builds on experimental and theoretial work established over
the last 30 years (see e.g. [SC81, OCC88℄). It is argued by Damasio [Dam94℄ and Piard
[Pi97℄ that aetive state is a key omponent of the human ability to reason :
\Evidene like this leads Dr. Damasio to the ounter-intuitive position that
feelings are typially indispensable for rational deisions ; they point us in the
proper diretion, where dry logi an then be of best use. . . .
The emotions, then, matter for rationality. In the dane of feeling and
thought the emotional faulty guides our moment-to-moment deisions, work-
ing hand-in-hand with the rational mind, enabling|or disabling|thought it-
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self. Likewise, the thinking brain plays an exeutive role in our emotions|
exept in those moments when emotions surge out of ontrol and the emotional
brain runs rampant." [Gol96℄
Support for this hypothesis is given by Damasio's studies on humans whose emotional
apaity has been limited due to brain injury [Dam94℄. The assumptions of this argument
have, however, been hallenged by Sloman [Slo99℄ :
\Damasio, Piard and others have misinterpreted the evidene about brain
damage in Damasio's book as implying that emotions are essential to intelli-
gene. This is a simple non-sequitur.
Certain sorts of frontal lobe damage produe two eets : (1) the patients
lose the ability to have ertain kinds of (seondary) emotional reations . . . and,
(2) the patients beome less reative and deisive, and less able to take strategi
deisions. . . .
It is fallaious to infer from this that (1) is the ause of (2)."
Resolving this argument is an important question from a ognitive siene perspetive.
However from the perspetive of humans and agents interating within a virtual environ-
ment the aetive omponent of the ommuniation is important to the users, whether or
not it is a key element of intelligene per se.
An extension of these arguments is that ommuniation of ues to aetive state is a
signiant omponent in human ommuniation. If this is truly the ase, rih ommuni-
ation in virtual environments should attempt to model this ommuniation of aetive
state, either expliitly or more likely by giving and reading ues typial of those observed
in human ommuniation. Sloman argues, quite properly, that voluntary or even invol-
untary emotional responses are generally very broad and we are not able to pereive the
underlying ondition whih led to the aetive state. While this is of ourse true, the on-
text of a ommuniation is likely to provide signiant disambiguation of aetive states.
The ontext provides a lter through whih the many fators that ould suggest emotions
(e.g. speed of talking, visible physiologial hanges, \body language" et etera) are rened
to an understanding of the emotional aspets of the ommuniation. There is of ourse no
guarantee of disambiguating suh ues orretly, dierent people behave dierently and
people may inorretly \see" ues they wish to see, these mistakes an lead to onfusion,
but in general our unonsious use of aetive ues aids ommuniation.
3 Virtual Environments.
In order to explore the theme of aet in detail it is rst important to give lear denitions
to some important onepts. A virtual environment is any plae whereby (people and/or
agents) an ome together to ommuniate. Under this denition virtual environments
over a wide range of possibilities. At one end of the spetrum there are video teleonfer-
enes between human partiipants, and at the other virtual environments ould be wholly
text based, as exemplied by MUDs and Internet Relay Chat. The more popular denition
is probably to onsider environments whih involve tehniques drawn from virtual reality,
suh as a teleonferening system with humans represented by avatars. An example whih
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falls between the extreme of a pure text based system and a fully immersive virtual envi-
ronment is the Mirosoft Comi Chat system [KSS96℄, whih uses stati graphis paired
with text, whih generates dynami omi strips as partiipants enter the disussion via
text input.
A key taxonomy of ommuniation onepts in virtual environments is to lassify the
partiipants in the ommuniations, and to study the apaity of the virtual environment
to failitate ommuniation between those partiipants. We explore suh issues in the
remainder of this setion.
3.1 Person{Person Communiation.
Full person{person ommuniation, as exemplied by video onferening, enables all nat-
ural ommuniation ues to be onveyed between the partiipants. Thus not only is the
basi information of the spoken words onveyed but also a rih stream of visual and aural
information whih is pereived onsiously or unonsiously. Some of this additional in-
formation will onvey details of the aetive states of the individuals whih an assist in
ontextual understanding of the spoken data and further understanding beyond this.
A naive view is that less natural virtual environments should attempt to give the
users of an environment the same aetive apabilities that they would have in real-world
interations. This view however misses out a number of important features of virtual
environments. The limited aetive apability of ertain virtual environments may be a
positive feature, rather than a hindrane, to some users. For example, partiipants in
text based hat rooms enjoy their anonymity and their ability to ontrol the interation
preisely by areful use of text [Tur96, Fon93, Fon97℄ :
\The Internet is another element of the omputer ulture that has on-
tributed to thinking about identity as multipliity. On it, people are able to
build a self by yling through many selves." [Tur96℄
The nature of suh interations would hange dramatially if these environments onveyed
information relating to the aetive states of partiipants. The idea of people experiment-
ing with alternative personae would be muh disrupted.
This situation may be rather dierent for partiipants in a syntheti graphial world
where they might be happy to have aetive information onveyed by alterations in speak-
ing style, posture or faial expression. However it is not lear what the role of suh systems
is. For a formal disussion a video onferene would perhaps be better, espeially as in-
reased bandwidth is inreasing the power of video onferening systems, arguably making
simpler representations redundant, and for the hat senario anonymity is important.
There are two interestingly ontrasted ways of ommuniating aetive states within a
virtual environment. The rst is for the user's omputer to interpret information about the
user's aetive state and to onvey that information as some kind of ariature of human
expression on the user's avatar. Suh a method would involve omplex pattern mathing
tehniques, whih ould draw inspiration from work on fae reognition (e.g. [JN95℄) and
on the work of Ekman and others [Ekm92a, Ekm92b, Ekm93℄ on lassifying basi human
emotions via faial expression. There are many other tehniques that ould be used to
extrat this same information, for example the use of aetive wearables (hapter 8 of
[Pi97℄, [Sta96, SMR
+
97℄). There are disadvantages to this approah, however, as the
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onsequenes of the wrong emotion being ommuniated are potentially dangerous|this
touhes on the well known issue of trust in agent systems [Mae94℄. There is also the
problems that avatar's expressive apability is likely to be restrited to a small range of
physial responses, thus reduing the aetive bandwidth of the ommuniation hannel.
The alternative to this is to diretly ommuniate this measured data (what we ould
all \aetive meta-fators") about the state of the user, without making any attempt to
interpret these features in terms of a disrete set of emotions or emotional dimensions.
The data ommuniated ould be that that would be available during fae-to-fae om-
muniation, suh as skin temperature (indiated by hanges in skin olour and texture) or
data whih are unique to the fat of being in a virtual environment (suh as an indiation
of how hard the user is typing on a keyboard or manipulating a joystik). In this situation
there is no need for one ommuniated fator to orrespond to one emotional fator, the
user an learn whih ombinations of fators ontribute to whih emotional states as they
beome austomed to working within the virtual environment. The main disadvantage
of this senario is that the user will have to spend a long time situated in the virtual
environment in order to learn how to interpret these ues. In partiular there would be a
need for standards aross virtual environments so that suh learning in one environment
ould be transferred eortlessly to another. Choosing appropriate meta-fators is in itself
a hallenging task.
3.2 Agent{Agent Communiation.
A more open question is the use of aetive states in agent{agent ommuniation. These
ommuniations may involve just a simple transation involving information transfer, or it
may be muh more omplex involving brokering of aess to resoures and bargaining over
information and aess to other agents or a user. Deisions in this environment ould use
standard AI methods, expert systems of some sort, searhing thought possibilities to nd
an optimum, et etera. It is suggested by Damasio's work that in order for suh ommu-
niation to follow the path of a person-person transation eah agent should have a model
of aetive state and that there should be some ommuniation of aetive information
between the agents. Sloman disagrees [Slo99℄ :
\Damasio assumed that only emotions an perform this kind of high-level
ontrol. However reent work in AI has produed alternative meta-level on-
trol mehanisms, inluding planners whih use \anytime algorithms" [BD89℄,
whih allows an interrupted planning proess to produe some initial partial
plans in intelligent mahines."
More human-like reasoning in agent{agent ommuniation has onsequenes for the kind
of algorithms used in agent arhitetures and multi-agent ommuniation [BD89℄ and in
setion 3.3 of this paper.
3.3 Person{Agent Communiation.
A nal form of virtual environment is that inhabited by a mixture of people and artiial
agents [Fon93, Fon97℄. In this environment the ability of the agent to respond may be
enhaned if the agent is able to hypothesise about the emotional state of the person. In
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general the agent will not be following its own agenda, like the partiipants in a hat room,
but will be attempting to better serve its human masters.
There is a further question here of how human emotional states should be represented
to agents. Should the agent \see" and \hear" emotions from an avatar? Or should the
agent have diret aess to signals used to produe partiular aet driven responses in
the avatar, reating its own onepts of aetive states by a proess akin to data fusion
[RM88℄?
There are advantages to both. In the rst senario the user is able to tailor their avatar
to their own personal aetive repertoire, making it easier for the agent to understand the
aet being ommuniated, and release only that information whih they are willing to give
agents aess to. In the seond senario the agent would develop a deeper understanding of
the onnetion between the \aetive meta-fators" and the desired aetive expression.
This issue is partiularly relevant in the senario where an agent will only meet a small
range of emotional situations | it ould learn to interpret only that range of aetive
states that it enounters, and be more aurate than if it had to deal with large amounts
of irrelevant over-interpreted information. The hoie of meta-fators is also governed by
the aeptability of the ommuniation of these fators to users. It has been noted (Mark
Nixon, personal ommuniation) that in biometri person-reognition users are generally
muh happier with mahines attempting to analyse fators that ould be reognised by
other humans (e.g. fae shape, gait) than more hidden fators (e.g. heart rate, skin
moisture level, or dna struture).
In order to maintain the naturalness of the interation the agent should perhaps re-
spond in an aet driven manner, perhaps indiating frustration or pleasure. A simple,
rough representation of emotion in the agent may aknowledge the fat that human dei-
sions may sometimes not follow an entirely rational path, while not attempting to atually
model the emotions that give rise to this irrationality.
Also the agent should be designed so that its own deisions are ontrolled not just by
internal riteria of optimality, but by the virtual soial ontext in whih it is situated.
This has parallels in Damasio's work with brain-damaged patients [Pi97℄ :
\This disorder is exemplied by \Elliot", whose IQ and ognitive abilities
are all normal or above average, but who suered damage to frontal lobe brain
tissue as the result of a brain tumor. When onfronted with a simple deision
as to when to shedule an appointment, Elliot will disappear into an endless
rational searh of \Well, this time might be good,", or \Maybe I will have to
be on that side of town so this time would be better," and on and on. Although
a ertain amount of indeisiveness is normal, in Elliot it is apparently not
aompanied by the usual feelings, suh as embarrassment, if someone is staring
at you for so long to make up your mind. Instead, Elliot's tendeny is to searh
an astronomially large spae of rational possibilities. Moreover, Elliot seems
to be unable to learn the links between dangerous hoies and bad feelings, so
he repeats bad deisions instead of learning otherwise. Elliot's lak of emotions
severely handiaps his ability to funtion rationally and intelligently."
This has impliations for the kind of algorithms used in agent systems. Suh algorithms
need to be interruptible, i.e. they need to give a reasonable approximation to the solution
even if they have to stop half way through. Some algorithms, for example those whih
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use a highly distributed, parallel proessing model, may not be able to bring the relevant
data together to give a response in a suÆiently quik time to ope with the soial ontext
within their virtual environment.
A nal thought. Does an entity in a virtual environment need to be aware if it is
ommuniating with an agent or person. This of ourse provokes standard AI arguments
about Turing tests et, but if we have a graphial environment where some ommuniation
is by gesture and aet synthesis, say in the fae, poor natural language and inability to
answer questions properly ould be overome by enouraging the human partiipant to
give more information.
4 Coda.
Aetive states are one of the most important fators in ommuniation, and for a virtual
environment to be truly realisti it annot ignore suh fators. However simply to repliate
existing aetive ommuniation hannels in a virtual environment is both naive and
misses a fasinating opportunity to enhane the value of virtual ommuniation. One
of the most interesting features of virtual environments is that it is possible to reate a
world that operates aording to entirely dierent laws of physis to the natural world.
Analogously, to explore alternative realms of aetive ommuniation in suh environments
is an interesting area for the future development of virtual environments.
Note.
This is an extended version of a paper from the Proeedings of the Seond Workshop on
Intelligent Virtual Agents (Ed. Daniel Ballin), University of Salford, September 1999.
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